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Adversarial Wiretap Channel with Public Discussion
Pengwei Wang and Reihaneh Safavi-Naini
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Abstract. Wyner’s elegant model of wiretap channel exploits noise in the commu-
nication channel to provide perfect secrecy against a computationally unlimited
eavesdropper without requiring a shared key. We consider an adversarial model
of wiretap channel proposed in [18,19] where the adversary is active: it selects a
fraction ρr of the transmitted codeword to eavesdrop and a fraction ρw of the code-
word to corrupt by “adding” adversarial error. It was shown that this model also
captures network adversaries in the setting of 1-round Secure Message Transmis-
sion [8]. It was proved that secure communication (1-round) is possible if and only
if ρr + ρw < 1.
In this paper we show that by allowing communicants to have access to a public dis-
cussion channel (authentic communication without secrecy) secure communication
becomes possible even if ρr + ρw > 1. We formalize the model of AWTPPD protocol
and for two efficiency measures, information rate and message round complexity
derive tight bounds. We also construct a rate optimal protocol family with mini-
mum number of message rounds. We show application of these results to Secure
Message Transmission with Public Discussion (SMT-PD), and in particular show
a new lower bound on transmission rate of these protocols together with a new
construction of an optimal SMT-PD protocol.
1 Introduction
In Wyner’s [20] model of secure communication and its generalization to broadcast sce-
nario [6], Alice is connected to Bob and Eve through two noisy channels, referred to
as the main channel and the eavesdropper channel, respectively. The goal is to send
a message from Alice to Bob with perfect secrecy and reliability. Wyner’s pioneering
work showed that communication with (asymptotic) perfect secrecy and reliability is
possible if the eavesdropper’s channel is noisier than the main channel. Importantly,
security is information theoretic and does not require a pre-shared secret key. Adver-
sarial model of wiretap channel where the adversary is active, dates back to Ozarow
and Wyner [13]. In their model instead of the noise corrupting the adversary’s view of
the transmissed codewprd, the adversary can select a fraction of the codeword that it
would like to “see”. More recently, wiretap channels where the active adevrsary also
corrupts the communication have been considered [1,4,12,18]. In these models the ad-
versary can select its view (also, observation or eavedropping) of the communication
and is also able to partially jam the channel by injecting noise in the main channel. In
this paper we consider a model of adversarial wiretap channel (AWTP channel) that is
proposed in [18,19]. In this model, the adversary adaptively chooses a fraction ρr of the
coordinates of the sent codeword for eavesdropping, and a fraction ρw of the codeword to
corrupt by adding an adversarial noise to the channel. The adversary’s eavesdropings
and corruptions are adaptive: for each action the adversary uses all its observations
and corruptions up to that point, to make its next choice. The goal of the adversary is
to break the security and/or reliability of communication. Codes that provide security
and reliability for these channels are called AWTP -codes. Interestingly AWTP model is
closely related to Secure Message Transmission (SMT) problem [8] in networks where
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Alice and Bob are connected by N node disjoint paths, a subset of which is controlled by
a computationally unlimited adversary and the goal is to provide secrecy and reliabil-
ity for the communication. The adversary in AWTP channel is more general (powerful)
than the widely studied threshold SMT adversary and can choose different subsets for
eavesdropping and corruption.
Motivation It was proved [18] that perfect secrecy and reliability for AWTP in 1-
round communication is possible if and only if, ρr + ρw < 1. We consider a scenario
where in addition to the AWTP channel, a public discussion channel denoted by PD,
is available to the communicants. We call this model AWTP with public discussion (or
AWTPPD for short). Our goal is to see if the use of this extra resource can make secure
communication possible when ρr + ρw > 1 (for example ρr = ρw = 0.9).
Public discussion channels had been considered in wiretap and SMT models, both. In
wiretap setting it was shown [11,2] that a public discussion channel substantially ex-
pands the range of scenarios in which secure communication is possible. In particular
secure communication becomes possible even if the eavesdroper channel is less noisy
than the main channel. A similar result holds for SMT. Access to a public discussion
channel in SMT was considered by Garay et.al. [9] who showed that secure message
tranmission will be possible when N ≥ t+ 1 while without a PD , N ≥ 2t+ 1.
We allow communicants to interact over the PD but assume communication over the
AWTP channel is one-way and from Alice to Bob. This restriction is to simplify our
analysis and as we will show, will still allow us to construct protocols that are optimal.
The assumption is also natural in settings where the sender node is more powerful
such as a base station.
Our results are self-contained and [18,19] are usedmotivate the study of the AWTP model
with PD.
1.1 Our work
Model and Definitions We define a multi-round message transmission protocol over
AWTPPD. The protocol may leak information to the adversray and the decoder may
output an incorrect message. We define secrecy as the statistical distance between the
adversary’s view of any two adversarially chosen messages, and reliability as the prob-
ability that the decoded message being different from the sent one, for any message.
An AWTPPD protocol in general, has multiple message rounds where in each message
round a protocol message is sent by Alice over AWTP channel or the PD channel, or
by Bob over the PD channel, each message possibly of different length. In each invo-
cation of the AWTP channel the adversary can choose a different read and write set.
An (ǫ, δ)-AWTPPD protocol guarantees that the leaked information about the message
is bounded by ǫ, and the probability of decoding an incorrect message is bounded by
δ. The information rate R of a AWTPPD protocol measures transmission efficiency of
the protocol in terms of transmission over the AWTP channel and is the number of
message (information) bits transmitted by the protocol, divided by the total number of
transmitted bits over this channel. The secrecy capacity Cǫ of an AWTPPD channel is
the maximum information rate that can be achieved by a AWTPPD protocol family as
the total number of bits communicated over the AWTP channel goes to infinity when
the security loss is bounded by ǫ.
Bounds We derive a tight upper bound on R: we first derive a bound on H(M), and
then use the bound to prove that the highest secrecy rate of an (ǫ, δ)-AWTPPD protocol
is bounded by Cǫ ≤ 1 − ρ + 2ǫ · (1 + log|Σ| 1ǫ ) + 2ǫn, where n is the total (bit) length
of transmission over the PD channel, Σ is the alphabet of the AWTP channel, and
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ρ = 1
N
|Sr ∪ Sw| is the fraction of components of a codeword that are read or written to,
by the adversary. For perfect secrecy capacity we have C0 ≤ 1−ρ. When Sr ∩Sw 6= ∅, we
have ρ < ρr + ρw, and perfectly secure communication is possible even if ρr + ρw > 1
(e.g. ρr = ρw = 0.9), as long as ρ < 1.
A second efficiency measure is the message round complexity RCm of the protocol.
We derive a tight lower bound on RCm for any AWTPPD protocol (one-way commu-
nication over AWTP ) with positive rate, when ρr + ρw > 1. We show that a secure
AWTPPD protocol with ρr + ρw > 1 and ρ < 1, cannot have two message rounds and so
RCm≥ 3.
Construction of AWTPPD protocol We construct a family of three message round
(0, δ)-AWTPPD protocols for which the rate can be made arbitrarily close to the upper
bound. That is, for any small ξ > 0, there is N0, such that for all N > N0, the rate
of the AWTPPD protocol family satisfies, R ≥ 1 − ρ − ξ and so the family achieves the
capacity. The number of message rounds of the protocol is minimal and meets the lower
bound on RCm. The construction is as follows: in the first message round Alice sends
to Bob over the AWTP channel a random sequence over Σ. In the second message
round, Bob randomly chooses elements of a universal hash family to calculate the hash
values of each of the received elements, and sends the hash values together with the
randomness used when choosing the hash function, to Alice over the PD channel. In the
third message round, Alice, encrypts the message using a key that is extracted from the
random values that are correctly received by Bob and sends it over the PD channel to
Bob, together with sufficient information that allows Bob to calculate the same key and
recover the message.
1.2 Relation with SMT-PD
In secure message transmission with public discussion channel (SMT-PD) [9], in addi-
tions to wires, communicants have access to a PD . Efficieny of SMT-PD protocols is in
terms of transmission rate (number transmitted bits over wires for each message bit).
Previous works on AWTP showed correspondence between a 1-round symmetric SMT
protocol and a AWTP code. A symmetric SMT protocol requires the set of transcripts on
all wires to be the same. All known threshold SMT protocols are symmetric. In the rest
of this paper we use the term SMT to refer to symmetric SMT protocols. In Section 6 we
define (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD , a subset of SMT-PD protocols in which only Alice can send
protocol messages over the wires but PD can be used in both ways. The bounds and
the construction of AWTPPD result in a lower bound on the transmission rate, a lower
bound on the message round complexity, and a new construction for (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-
PD . In Section 6 we compare these results with the known bounds and constructions of
SMT-PD. The message round lower bound for (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD also lower bounds the
message round complexity of general SMT-PD (two-way communication over wires) and
so can be compared with the round complexity bounds in [9,16]. Similarly the construc-
tion of (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD can be compared with those in [9]. A detailed comparison of
the constructions is given in Table 1. Compared to other SMT-PD protocols that achieve
the upper bound on the information rate of an ǫ-SMT[ow−s]-PD family when the number
of wires (N ) grows while the fraction of eavesdropped and corrupted wires are given by
the constants ρr and ρw respectively, and the leakage is bounded by ǫ, the unique prop-
erty of our construction is that the adversary’s eavesdropping and corruption sets can
be different.
1.3 Related Work
Maurer’s [11] introduced PD channels first in the context of key agreement over wire-
tap channels; this was also independently considered in [2]. Since the PD channel is
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considered free, the established key can be used to send the message securely over this
channel and so the communication cost of the message transmission will stay the same
as that of the key establishment. Our construction also has two steps: a key estab-
lishment, followed by encrypting the message and sending it over the public discussion
channel. This is also the approach in [9] (Protocol I) and [16].
The model of adversarial wiretap in [14,15] extends wiretap II to include active (jam-
ming) adversarial noise.
SMT-PD was introduced in [10] as a building block in almost-everywhere secure multi-
party computation. Bounds on the required number of rounds were derived in [16]. In
[9] a bound on transmission rate over wires (not including communication over the PD )
was derived. The paper presents two constructions: protocol I is optimal in the sense
that the transmission rate is of the order of the bound as the number of wire increases,
and protocol II in which the goal is to minimize communication over the PD . This re-
duction is however at the expense of lower rate on the wires. I Table 6.1 compares the
information rate of these constructions for large N .
1.4 Organization
In Section 2, we introduce AWTP channel and the PD channel, and in Section 3, de-
fine AWTPPD protocols. In Section 4, we derive the upper bound on the rate, and the
minimum requirement on the message round complexity. In Section 5, we give the con-
struction of an optimal AWTPPD protocol. In Section 6, we give the relation between
AWTPPD protocol and SMT-PD protocol. In Section 7, we discuss our results, open prob-
lems and future works.
2 Preliminaries
We use, calligraphic letters X to denote sets, Pr(X) to denote a probability distribution
on the set X , and X to denote a random variable that takes values from X with proba-
bility Pr(X). The conditional probability ofX given E, is Pr[X = x|E]. log() is logarithm
in base two. Shannon entropy of a random variable X is, H(X) =
∑
x Pr(x) logPr(x),
and conditional entropy of a variable X given Y , is H(X |Y ) = ∑x,y Pr(x, y) logPr(x|y).
The min-entropy of a variable X is H∞(X) = minx∈X − logPr(X = x). Statistical dis-
tance between two random variables X1, X2, defined over X , is given by SD(X1, X2) =
1
2
∑
x |Pr(X1 = x) − Pr(X2 = x)|. Mutual information between random variables X and
Y is given by, I(X,Y ) = H(X)−H(X |Y ). Hamming weight of a vector e is denoted by be
wt(e).
2.1 Channel Models
We consider two types of channels: AWTP channel and PD channel. A channel can be
one-way or two-way.
Definition 1. A one-way channel from Alice to Bob (Bob to Alice) is used to send mes-
sages from Alice to Bob (Bob to Alice). A two-way channel can be used in both directions,
from Alice to Bob, or from Bob to Alice.
Let [N ] = {1, · · · , N}, Sr = {i1, · · · , iρrN} ⊆ [N ] and Sw = {j1, · · · , jρwN} ⊆ [N ]. Support
of a vector x = (x1 · · ·xN ) ∈ ΣN , denoted by SUPP(x), is the set of positions where
xi 6= 0.
Definition 2. A (ρr, ρw)-Adversarial Wiretap Channel ((ρr, ρw)-AWTP Channel) is an
adversarial channel that it is (partially) controlled by an adversary Eve, with two capa-
bilities: Reading and Writing. For a codeword of length N , Eve selects a subset Sr ⊆ [N ]
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of size |Sr| = ρrN to read (eavesdrop), and selects a subset Sw ⊆ [N ] of size |Sw| = ρwN
to write to (corrupt). The writing is by adding to c an error vector e with SUPP(e) = Sw,
resulting in c+ e to be received. The adversary is adaptive and to select a component for
reading and/or writing, it uses its knowledge of the codeword at the time. The subset
S = Sr ∪Sw of size |S| = ρN , is the set of components of the codeword that the adversary
reads or writes to.
The AWTP channel is called a restricted-AWTP channel if Sr = Sw = S.
We assume the adversarial wiretap channel is one-way and can only be used by Alice.
Definition 3. (Public Discussion Channel (PD Channel)) is an authenticated channel
between Alice and Bob, that can be read by everyone including Eve.
We assume the PD channel is two-way can be used by Alice and Bob, both.
Hence in our AWTPPD setting Alice and Bob have access to a one-way AWTP channel
and a two-way PD channel. We consider protocols with multiple message rounds and
assume in each message round a message is sent on one of the channels available to the
communicants. In particular, in each message round Alice can use either the AWTP or
the PD channel.
Definition 4. The message round complexity RCm of a protocol is the total number
invocations of channels (AWTP and PD ) by the two the communicants.
3 AWTPPD Protocol
Alice (sender) wants to send a message (information) m ∈ M, securely and reliably
to Bob (receiver), using a multi-round protocol over a AWTPPD channel, called an
AWTPPD protocol.
The protocol consists of a sequence of message rounds. Each message round is in one
of the following form: (i) Alice sends a message to Bob over AWTP channel, (ii) Alice
sends a message to Bob over PD channel, and (iii) Bob sends a message to Alice over
the PD channel.
Let ℓc and ℓd denote the total number of invocations of the AWTP channel, and the
PD channel, respectively, and assume ℓ = ℓc+ ℓd. Let rA and rB denote the randomness
used by Alice and Bob.
The protocol messages (also called codewords) sent over the AWTP channel and the
PD channel are denoted by ci and di, respectively.
We use ci = {c1 · · · ci} to denote the concatenation of protocol messages, transmit-
ted over the AWTP channel after the ith invocation of the AWTP channel. Similarly
di = {d1 · · · di} is the concatenation of protocol messages sent over PD , after the ith
invocation of this channel.
Let the protocol message alphabets of the AWTP and PD channels be Σ and F2, re-
spectively. In the ith invocation of the AWTP channel, Alice sends a codeword of length
Ni. In the i
th invocation of the PD channel, Alice or Bob, sends a binary message of
length ni. The number of symbols sent over the AWTP channel is N =
∑ℓc
i=1Ni, and the
number of bits transmitted over the PD , is n =
∑ℓd
i=1 ni.
Let the view of Alice and Bob when sending the ith codeword be, viA and v
i
B , respec-
tively. The view of a participant consists of all the protocol messages that are received
before sending the ith codeword. When sending a message m, in the ith invocation of
the AWTP channel, Alice constructs a codeword ci using her view, local randomness,
and m,
ci = AWTPPD(m, rA, i, v
i
A,AWTP).
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In each invocation of the PD channel, Alice (or Bob) generates the codeword di using
their view, local randomness and m,
di = AWTPPD(m, rX , i, v
i
X ,PD),
where X ∈ {A,B} if the protocol message constructed by Alice (Bob).
Definition 5 ((ǫ, δ)-AWTPPD protocol). A secure (ǫ, δ)-AWTPPD protocol satisfies the
following two properties:
1. Secrecy: For any two messages m1,m2 ∈ M, the statistical distance between Eve’s
views of the protocol, when the same random coins rE are used by Eve, is bounded
by ǫ.
max
m0,m1
SD(ViewE(AWTPPD(m1), rE),ViewE(AWTPPD(m2), rE)) ≤ ǫ
2. Reliability: For any message MS chosen by Alice, the probability that Bob outputs
the message sent by Alice, is at least 1− δ. That is,
Pr(MR 6=MS) ≤ δ.
Here probability is over the randomness of Alice and Bob and the adversary.
The AWTPPD protocol provides perfect secrecy if ǫ = 0. If adversary is passive, then Bob
can always output the correct message mS and Pr(MR = MS) = 1. A restricted-(ǫ, δ)-
AWTPPD protocol is over a restricted-AWTPPD channel where Ni = Nj, Si = Sj = S for
any 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ ℓ.
The efficiency measures of an (ǫ, δ)-AWTPPD protocol Π are, (i) the information rate
R(Π) = log |M|
N log |Σ| and, (ii) the message round complexity RC(Π) = (rawtp, rpd) denoting the
number of invocations of the AWTP and PD channels, respectively .
Definition 6. An (ǫ, δ)-AWTPPD protocol family for a (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel, is a fam-
ily of protocols Π = {ΠN}N∈N, where ΠN = (ǫ, δ)-AWTPPD is an AWTPPD protocol for
the (ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel. A protocol family Π achieves information rate R, if for any
ξ > 0 there exist N0 such that for any N ≥ N0, there is δ < ξ and,
log |M|
N log |Σ| ≥ R− ξ.
The ǫ-secrecy (perfect secrecy) capacity Cǫ (C0) of a (ρr, ρw)-AWTPPD channel is the
largest achievable rate of all (ǫ, δ)-AWTPPD ((0, δ)-AWTPPD ) protocol families for the
channel.
Note that we effectively assume communication over PD is free and consider commu-
nication cost of the AWTP only.
4 Bounds on (ǫ, δ)-AWTPPD Protocols
We derive two bounds for (ǫ, δ)-AWTPPD protocols: an upper bound on the rate, and a
lower bound on the minimum number of message rounds required for such protocols.
4.1 Upper Bound on Rate
Theorem 1. The rate of an (ǫ, δ)-AWTPPD protocol is bounded by,
C
ǫ ≤ 1− ρ+ 2ǫ · (1 + log|Σ|
1
ǫ
) + 2ǫn
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In the following proof we assume ρr + ρw = 1, and |Sri ∪ Swi | = ρN < N for i = 1, · · · , ℓc.
The proof can be extended to ρr+ρw > 1 and |Sri ∪Swi | = ρN < N also. The proof outline
is as follows. We define an adversary Adv1 and prove an upper bound on the rate of any
protocol over the AWTPPD channel assuming this adversary. This gives un upper bound
on the rate of the AWTPPD protocol against any general adversary.
The proof has three steps.
First (Step1), we define a weak adversary that before the start of the protocol chooses,
(i) the reading and writing sets of all invocations of the AWTP channel, and (ii) the ran-
dom errors of appropriate weight for each AWTP channel invocation. For this adversary,
we prove two lemmas (Lemmas 1 and 2) related to the entropy of the transmitted mes-
sage. Second (Step 2), we use the lemmas to derive a bound on
log |M|
N log |Σ| . Finally (Step 3)
we prove the bound on the channel capacity.
Notations. Let the codeword length in the ith invocation of the AWTP channel be Ni,
and [N ] =
⋃ℓc
i=1[Ni]. Let S
r
i and S
w
i denote the read and write sets of the adversary in
the ith invocation of the AWTP channel with |Sri | = ρrNi and |Swi | = ρwNi, and denote
Si,r = {Sr1 , · · · , Sri } and Si,w = {Sw1 , · · · , Swi }.
Let Sai = S
r
i \Swi be the set of read only, Sbi = Sri ∩ Swi the set of read and write, Sci =
Swi \Sri the set of write only, and Sdi = [Ni]\(Sri ∪ Swi ) the set of neither read nor write
components, in the ith invocation of the AWTP channel. Finally, Sℓc,a = ∪ℓci=1Sai , Sℓc,b =
∪ℓci=1Sbi , Sℓc,c = ∪ℓci=1Sci , and Sℓc,d = ∪ℓci=1Sdi .
Let ci and di be the codewords transmitted over the AWTP channel and PD channel in
the ith invocations of the two channels, respectively; ci,j and di,j denote the j
th compo-
nents of codeword ci and di, respectively; c
i and di denote concatenations of all code-
words sent in all invocations up to, and including, the ith invocations of the AWTP and
the PD channels, respectively. We use capital letters to refer to the random variables
associated with, ci, di, ci,j , di,j , c
i and di, as Ci, Di, Ci,j , Di,j , C
i andDi, respectively. Let
Cℓc,r and Cℓc,w be the random variables of the protocol messages on the sets Sℓc,r and
Sℓc,w, and Cℓc,a, Cℓc,b, Cℓc,c, Cℓc,d be the random variables corresponding to the sets,
Sℓc,a, Sℓc,b, Sℓc,c, Sℓc,d, respectively.
Proof. The proof has three steps:
Step 1.
We define an adversary Adv1 that works as follows:
1. Selects the reading and writing sets Sℓc,r and Sℓc,w, of all AWTP channel invoca-
tions, before the start of the protocol.
2. For each invocation, chooses a random error vector ei of appropriate weight; that is,
chooses ewi , with uniform distribution from Σ
|Swi |; we have Pr(ewi ) =
1
|Σ|ρwNi
.
3. During the protocol execution, uses the error vectors to corrupt the AWTP messages,
reads the transmission on Sℓc,r and over PD channel.
We give two lemmas that follow from ǫ-secrecy and δ-reliability of the (ǫ, δ)-AWTPPD
protocol against Adv1. Let VE denote the random variable of the adversary view at the
end of the protocol.
Lemma 1. For an (ǫ, δ)-AWTPPD protocol, the following holds:
I(M ;VE) ≤ 2ǫN · log( |Σ|
ǫ
) + 2ǫn
Proof is in Appendix A.1.
Since Adv1 selects the reading sets S
ℓc,r before the start of the protocol, we have, VE =
{Cℓc,r, Dℓd}, and so, we have
I(M ;Cℓc,rDℓd) ≤ 2ǫN · log( |Σ|
ǫ
) + 2ǫn (1)
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Lemma 2. For an (ǫ, δ)-AWTPPD protocol, the following holds assumingAdv1 adversary,
H(M |Cℓc,aCℓc,dDℓd) ≤ H(δ) + δ log |M|
Proof is in Appendix A.2.
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 are used to prove an upper bound on the rate of an (ǫ, δ)-
AWTPPD protocol, assuming adversary Adv1.
Step 2.We prove the upper bound,
log |M|
N log |Σ| ≤ 1− ρ+ 2ǫ · (1 + log|Σ|
1
ǫ
) + 2ǫn+ 2H(δ) + δn
Here, N is the total number of symbols sent over AWTP channel, and n is the number
of bits sent over the PD channel. Let Cℓc and Dℓd denote the set of possible protocol
messages over the AWTP channel and the PD channel, respectively. We have,
H(M) = I(M ;Cℓc,rDℓd) + H(M |Cℓc,rDℓd) (2)
From Lemma 1, the first term can be upper bound as,
I(M ;Cℓc,rDℓd) ≤ 2ǫ ·N log( |Σ|
ǫ
) + 2ǫn (3)
The upper bound on the second item H(M |Cℓc,rDℓd) is,
H(M |Cℓc,rDℓd)
= H(M |Cℓc,aCℓc,bDℓd)
= H(MCℓc,b|Cℓc,aDℓd)− H(Cℓc,b|Cℓc,aDℓd)
= H(M |Cℓc,aDℓd) + H(Cℓc,b|MCℓc,aDℓd)− H(Cℓc,b|Cℓc,aDℓd)
= H(MCℓc,d|Cℓc,aDℓd)− H(Cℓc,d|MCℓc,aDℓd) + H(Cℓc,b|MCℓc,aDℓd)− H(Cℓc,b|Cℓc,aDℓd)
= H(M |Cℓc,aCℓc,dDℓd) + H(Cℓc,d|Cℓc,aDℓd)− H(Cℓc,d|MCℓc,aDℓd) + H(Cℓc,b|MCℓc,aDℓd)
− H(Cℓc,b|Cℓc,aDℓd)
(1)
≤ H(M |Cℓc,aCℓc,dDℓd) + H(Cℓc,d|Cℓc,aDℓd)− H(Cℓc,d|MCℓc,aDℓd)
(2)
≤ H(M |Cℓc,aCℓc,dDℓd) + H(Cℓc,d)
(4)
Inequality (1) is from,
H(Cℓc,b|MCℓc,aDℓd) ≤ H(Cℓc,b|Cℓc,aDℓd). Inequality (2) follows from,H(Cℓc,d|Cℓc,aDℓd) ≤
H(Cℓc,d) and H(Cℓc,d|MCℓc,aDℓd) ≥ 0.
From H(Cℓc,d) ≤ log |Cℓc,d| ≤ N(1− ρ) log |Σ|, we have,
H(Cℓc,d) ≤ N(1− ρ) log |Σ| (5)
Using Lemma 2, we have,
H(M |Cℓc,aCℓc,dDℓd) ≤ δ log |M|+ H(δ) (6)
From (4), (5), (6), we have,
H(M |Cℓc,rDℓd) ≤ N(1− ρ) log |Σ|+ δ log |M|+ H(δ) (7)
We also have,
log |M|
(1)
≤ log |CℓcDℓd |
(2)
≤ N log |Σ|+ n (8)
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where CℓcDℓd are possible (error free) transcripts of the protocol generated by the pro-
tocol encoders (at Alice and Bob), (1) is because decoding without adversarial error
recovers the message and so the number of possible encoding transcripts is ≥ |M|, and
(2) is because of the set of corrupted transcripts is larger than uncorrupted ones.
Using (7) and (8), we have,
H(M |Cℓc,rDℓd) ≤ N(1− ρ) log |Σ|+ δ(N log |Σ|+ n) + H(δ) (9)
Using (2), (3), and (9), gives the upper bound on H(M),
H(M) ≤ N(1− ρ) log |Σ|+ 2ǫ ·N log( |Σ|
ǫ
) + 2ǫn+ δN log |Σ|+ δn+ H(δ)
The above inequality must hold for any distribution on M, and in particular for a
uniform distribution with H(M) = log |M|. Using δ ≤ H(δ) for 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1/2, we have,
log |M|
N log |Σ| ≤ 1− ρ+ 2ǫ · (1 + log|Σ|
1
ǫ
) + 2ǫn+ 2H(δ) + δn
Step 3.We show that ǫ-secrecy capacity of a (ρr, ρw)-AWTPPD is bounded by,
C
ǫ ≤ 1− ρ+ 2ǫ · (1 + log|Σ|
1
ǫ
) + 2ǫn
Proof is by contradiction.
Let Cǫ = 1−ρ+2ǫ·(1+log|Σ| 1ǫ )+2ǫn+ξˆ, for some small constant ξˆ > 0. FromDefinition 6,
for any 0 < ξˆ′ ≤ min( ξˆ5n ,H−1( ξˆ5 )), there is N0, such that for any N > N0, we have δ < ξˆ′
and,
log |M|
N log |Σ| ≥ C
ǫ − ξˆ′
= 1− ρ+ 2ǫ · (1 + log|Σ|
1
ǫ
) + 2ǫn+ 2H(δ) + δn+ ξˆ − ξˆ′ − 2H(δ)− δn
≥ 1− ρ+ 2ǫ · (1 + log|Σ|
1
ǫ
) + 2ǫn+ 2H(δ) + δn+ ξˆ′
>
log |M|
N log |Σ|
This contradicts the bound on
log |M|
N log |Σ| , and so,
C
ǫ ≤ 1− ρ+ 2ǫ · (1 + log|Σ|
1
ǫ
) + 2ǫn
⊓⊔
Corollary 1. The perfect secrecy capacity of a (ρr, ρw)-AWTPPD channel is bounded as,
C
0 ≤ 1− ρ
4.2 Lower Bound on Message Round Complexity
An efficient construction of a (0, δ)-AWTP code (one message round) with rate R =
1 − ρr − ρw is given in [19], implying that secure transmission over AWTP channels
with one message round protocols is possible if, ρr + ρw < 1. In Section 4.1, we proved
that for AWTPPD channels, C
0 ≤ 1 − ρ and so secure communication with ρr + ρw > 1
may be possible, as long as ρ < 1.
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Theorem 2. Perfectly secure communication over AWTPPD channel requires,
(i) one message round protocol, if ρr + ρw < 1.
(ii) a protocol with at least three message rounds, if ρr + ρw ≥ 1. That is,
RC
{
≥ 1 if ρr + ρw < 1;
≥ 3 if ρr + ρw ≥ 1.
We use the same notations as in Section 4.1.
Proof. We only need to prove (ii). The protocol must have at least two message rounds
and so can have one of the following forms. Note that to achieve privacy, at least one
message round of AWTP channel is needed.
1. Rnd 1: Alice
AWTP−→ Bob; Rnd 2: Alice PD−→ Bob.
2. Rnd 1: Alice
AWTP−→ Bob; Rnd 2: Alice AWTP−→ Bob.
3. Rnd 1: Alice
AWTP−→ Bob; Rnd 2: Bob PD−→ Alice.
4. Rnd 1: Alice
PD−→ Bob; Rnd 2: Alice AWTP−→ Bob.
5. Rnd 1: Bob
PD−→ Alice; Rnd 2: Alice AWTP−→ Bob.
The third, fourth and fifth forms are not possible: in all these cases Bob’s decoder will
have the vector received through a one round AWTP channel and so the protocol cannot
have rate higher than 1− ρr − ρw.
Lemma 3. In an (0, δ)-AWTPPD protocol of the forms (1) or (2) above, if ρr + ρw ≥ 1,
then,
2H(δ) ≥ 1− 1|M|
Proof is in Appendix A.3.
5 An optimal (0, δ)-AWTPPD Protocol
We first introduce the building blocks of the AWTPPD protocol, and then describe the
construction. The rate of the protocol meets the upper bound. The protocol has three
message rounds and so meets the minimum message round complexity. The construc-
tion is inspired by Shi et al. [16].
5.1 Universal Hash Family
An (N,n,m)-hash family is a set F of N functions, f : X → T , f ∈ F , where |X | = n
and |T | = m. Without loss of generality, we assume n ≥ m.
Definition 7. [17] Suppose that the (N,n,m)-hash family F has range T which is an
additive Abelian group.F is called ǫ-∆ universal, if for any two elements x1, x2 ∈ X , x1 6=
x2,, and for any element t ∈ T , there are at most ǫN functions f ∈ F such that f(x1) −
f(x2) = t, were the operation is from the group.
We will use a classic construction of u
q
-universal hash family [17]. Let q be a prime and
u ≤ q − 1. Let the message be x = {x1, · · · , xu}. For α ∈ Fq, define the universal hash
function hashα by the rule,
t = hashα(x) = x1α+ x2α
2 + · · ·+ xuαu mod q (10)
Then {hashα(·) : α ∈ Fq} is a uq -∆ universal (q, qu, q)-hash family.
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5.2 Randomness Extractor
A randomness extractor is a function, which is applied to a weakly random entropy
source (i.e., a non-uniform random variable), to obtain a uniformly distributed source.
Definition 8. [7] A (seeded) (n,m, r, δ)-strong extractor is a function Ext : qn × qd → qm
such that for any source X with H∞(X) ≥ r, we have
SD((Ext(X, Seed), Seed), (U, Seed)) ≤ δ
with the seed uniformly distributed over Fdq .
A function Ext : qn → qm is a (seedless) (n,m, r, δ)-extractor if for any source X with
H∞(X) ≥ r, the distribution Ext(X) satisfies SD(Ext(X), U) ≤ δ.
A seedless extractor can be constructed from Reed-Solomon (RS) codes [5]. The con-
struction works only for a restricted class of sources, known as symbol-fixing sources.
Definition 9. An (n,m) symbol-fixing source is a tuple of independent random vari-
ables X = (X1, · · · , Xn), defined over a set Ω, such that m of the variables take values
uniformly and independently from Ω, and the rest have fixed values.
We show a construction of a seedless (n,m,m log q, 0)-extractor from RS-codes. Let q ≥
n +m. Consider an (n,m) symbol-fixing source X = (X1, · · · , Xn) ∈ Fnq with H∞(X) ≥
m log q. The extraction has two steps:
1. Construct a polynomial f(x) ∈ Fq[X ] of degree ≤ n − 1, such that f(i) = xi for
i = 0, · · · , n− 1.
2. Evaluate the polynomial at i = {n, · · · , n+m− 1}. That is,
Ext(x) = (f(n), f(n+ 1), · · · , f(n+m− 1))
5.3 AWTPPD Protocol
Let the AWTP channel have alphabet Σ = Fuq where q > 2uN
2, and the message be
m = {m1, · · · ,mℓ} ∈ M, where mi ∈ Fq. Let N denote the transmission length over
the AWTP channel. We use a u
q
-∆ universal (q, qu−1, q)-hash family and the seedless
(uN, ℓ, ℓ log q, 0)-extractor, above.
AWTPPD Protocol
– Rnd 1: Alice
AWTP−→ Bob. For i ∈ N :
Alice randomly chooses a vector ri = {ri,1, · · · , ri,u−1} ∈ Fu−1q , and βi ∈ Fq. Alice
sends c = (c1, · · · , cN ) ∈ Fuq with ci = {ri, βi} to Bob, over the AWTP channel.
Bob receives y = (y1, · · · , yN), where yi = {r′i, β′i}.
– Rnd 2: Bob
PD−→ Alice.
Bob generates random keys, (α1, · · · , αN ), αi ∈ Fq, for the hash family, and
generates t = (t1, · · · , tN ) where, ti = hashαi(r′i) + β′i mod q. Bob maps d1 =
{α1, · · · , αN , t1, · · · , tN} to a binary vector over F2, and sends d1 to Alice, over
the PD channel. Alice receives d1.
– Rnd 3: Alice
PD−→ Bob.
• Alice checks,
hashαi(ri) + βi
?
= ti mod q, i = 1 · · ·N
and constructs a binary vector v = (v1, · · · , vN ), where with vi = 1 if
hashαi(ri) + βi = ti mod q, and vi = 0, otherwise.
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• Let, vi1 · · · = vis = 1. Alice does the following.
–concatenates all rij for which vij = 1, and obtains (ri1 || · · · ||ris) over Fq.
–uses the extractor on this string, and obtains a uniformly random string,
k = Ext(ri1 || · · · ||ris).
• Alice encrypts the message m and obtains c = {c1, · · · , cℓ}, where ci = ki +
mi mod q for i = 1, · · · , ℓ. Alice maps d2 = {c,v} (over Fq) into a binary
vector and sends it to Bob over the PD channel.
Bob receives d2.
– Bob decodes Dec(y1, d1, d2) as follows.
• Constructs the vector (r′i1 || · · · ||r′is) with r′ij ∈ Fq, for all vij = 1 in v. He uses
the extractor to obtain, k′ = Ext(r′i1 || · · · ||r′is).• Recovers the messagem′ with m′i = ci − k′i mod q for i = 1, · · · , ℓ.
Lemma 4. The AWTPPD protocol above, provides perfect secrecy if ℓ ≤ (u − 1)(1− ρ)N .
Lemma 5. The probability of decoding error in the AWTPPD protocol is δ ≤ uNq .
Lemma 6. The rate of the AWTPPD protocol family is R = 1− ρ.
Proof. For a small ξ > 0, let the parameters of AWTPPD protocol be chosen as u =
1
ξ
,
q > 2uN2, ℓ = (u − 1)(1 − ρ)N , N0 ≥ 1ξ and Σ = Fuq . For uniform message distribution,
we have log |M| = ℓ log q, and so for any N > N0, the rate of AWTPPD protocol family is
given by,
log |M|
N log |Σ| =
(u− 1)(1− ρ)N log q
uN log q
= (1 − ξ)(1− ρ) ≥ 1− ρ− ξ
The probability of decoding error is bounded by,
δ ≤ uN
q
≤ 1
2N
≤ ξ
2
≤ ξ
Theorem 3. For any small ξ > 0, the protocol above is a (0, δ)-AWTPPD protocol with
rate R(ΠN ) = 1 − ρ − ξ. The transmission alphabet over the AWTP channel is of size
|Σ| = q 1ξ , and the decoding error is δ < ξ. The rate of the protocol approaches R = 1− ρ
as, N →∞. The protocol has RCm=3 and the decoder computation is O((N log q)2).
6 AWTPPD Protocol and SMT-PD
In SMT-PD a sender S (Alice) and a receiver R (Bob) interact over N node disjoint
paths (wires) in a synchronous network and a public discussion channel. Wires and
the PD both are used for two-way communication. An SMT-PD protocol proceeds in
rounds. In each round, Alice (Bob) sends protocol messages over wires and/or the PD
channel, which will be received by Bob (Alice) before the end of the round. (Note that
a round in SMT-PD may consist of one or two message rounds.) A computationally
unbounded adversary (Eve) can corrupt up to t wires. Eve can eavesdrop, modify or
block messages sent over a corrupted wire. Adversary is adaptive and can corrupt wires
any time during the protocol execution and after observing communications over the
wires that she has corrupted so far. We consider protocol families Π = {ΠN : N ∈ N}
defined for t = ρN where 0 < ρ < 1 is a constant.
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Definition 10. A protocol between S and R is an (ǫ, δ)-secure message transmission
with public discussion ((ǫ, δ)-SMT-PD) protocol if the following two conditions are sat-
isfied.
– Privacy: For every two messages m1,m2 ∈M and randomness rE used by Eve,
max
m1,m2
SD(ViewE(SMTPD(m1), rE),ViewE(SMTPD(m2), rE)) ≤ ǫ,
where the probability is over the randomness of S,R.
– Reliability: For any message MS chosen by Alice, Bob recovers the message with
probability larger than 1− δ; that is,
Pr(MR 6=MS) ≤ δ,
where the probability is over the randomness of players S,R and Eve.
Remark 1. In the above definition of SMT-PD, (i) Sr = Sw, and for |Sr| = |Sw| = ρN ,
(ii) wires are used for two-way communication, and (iii) in each message round of the
protocol, Alice (Bob) can invoke both types of channels simultaneously (wires and the
PD) and so send two protocol message. In our model in Section 3 however, (i) Sr and Sw
can be chosen arbitrarily, (ii) AWTP is from Alice to Bob only, and (iii) in each message
round one message over one channel (AWTP , or PD) can be sent.
Efficiency parameters of an SMT-PD protocol are, Round Complexity RC, Transmission
Rate TR, and computational complexity.
– RC is the number of rounds of a protocol. We also use RCm to denote message round
complexity of these protocols.
– TR is the number of communicated bits for transmitting a single message bit. Let
Wi denote the set of possible transmissions on wire i. The transmission rate of an
SMT-PD protocol is given by,
TR =
∑N
i=1 log |Wi|
log |M|
An SMT-PD protocol is optimal if the transmission rate is of the order (Big O nota-
tion) of the lower bound.
– An SMT-PD protocol is computationally efficient if the computational complexity of
the sender and the receiver algorithms, is polynomial in N .
6.1 AWTPPD and One-way SMT-PD
AWTP codes are defined over an alphabet Σ and all components of a codeword are
elements of Σ. In SMT protocols however, the set of transmissions over different wires
may be different.
Definition 11 (Symmetric SMT). An SMT protocol is called a symmetric if the pro-
tocol remains invariant under any permutation of the wires.
LetW ij , j = 1 · · ·N, i = 1 · · · r, denote the set of possible transmissions on wire j in an r-
round SMT protocol. For a symmetric protocol,W ij =W i is independent of j. All known
constructions of threshold SMT protocols are symmetric.
Definition 12. A one-way symmetric secure message transmission with public discus-
sion ((ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD ) protocol is an SMT-PD protocol in which transmission over
wires is in one direction (from Alice to Bob, or Bob to Alice). The protocol is invariant
under any permutation of the wires. The N wires and the PD channel, can be invoked
simultaneously.
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We consider protocols where Alice wants to send amessage to Bob and so AWTP channel
is used by Alice.
Theorem 4. There is a one-to-one correspondence between restricted (ǫ, δ)-AWTPPD protocols
and (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD protocols. The following results on the latter protocols, follow
from the results on the former in Section 4.
1. The lower bound on the transmission rate of a (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD protocol is,
TR ≥ N
N − t+ ǫ′ + 2H(δ)N + δnN (11)
where ǫ′ = 2Nǫ(1 + log|W|
1
ǫ
) + 2ǫnN .
For protocols with perfect secrecy (ǫ = 0) we have,
TR ≥ N
N − t+ 2H(δ)N + δnN . (12)
2. The lower bound on the message round complexity of a (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow]-PD protocol is
three.
Proof. It is easy to see that an (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD protocol gives a AWTPPD protocol:
using the same conversion as in [18] a protocol message over (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD wires
gives a protocol message over AWTP channel by considering wire i as component i of the
AWTP codeword; messages over PD will stay the same in both. The conversion holds in
reverse direction also. The lower bound on transmission rate follows by noting that the
transmission rate of a (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD protocol is the inverse of the rate of the cor-
responding AWTPPD protocol, and so the upper bound on the rate of AWTPPD protocols
implies a lower bound on the transmission rate of (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD protocols. The
lower bound on message round complexity follows from the similar bound on the corre-
sponding AWTPPD protocols. Details are given in Appendix C.1.
Construction A (ǫ, δ)-AWTPPD protocol gives a restricted-(ǫ, δ)-AWTPPD protocol with
ρ = ρr = ρw. This latter, using the protocol conversion in Theorem 4, gives an (ǫ, δ)-
SMT[ow−s]-PD protocol. In Section 5.3 we gave the construction of a (0, δ)-AWTPPD protocol
with minimum number of message rounds and rate approaching the capacity of the
(ρr, ρw)-AWTP channel. This leads to the following.
Lemma 7. There is a three message round (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD protocol, with transmis-
sion rate, O( N
N−t ), and decoding computational complexity equal to, O((N log q)2).
Comparison with known results In [9] it was shown that secure SMT-PD protocols
exist forN ≥ t+1, and the following lower bound on the transmission rate was derived,
TR ≥
N · (− log( 1|M| + 2ǫ)− H(
√
δ)− 2m√δ)
(N − t)m . (13)
Here, m = log |M|. The bound gives a lower bound on the transmission rate of (ǫ, δ)-
SMT[ow−s]-PD protocols as an (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD protocol is an SMT-PD protocol with
extra restriction. None of the two bounds, (11) and (13), completely dominates the other:
1. For ǫ = 0 and δ > 0, (13) will be a tighter bound. This is because for perfectly secure
SMT-PD, for log |M| ≫ H(√δ), the bound (13) can be written as,
TR ≥ N
N − t
(1− 2√δ) log |M|
log |M| . (14)
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From,
N
N − t (1− 2
√
δ) =
N − 2√δN
N − t ≥
N
N − t+ 2√δN ≥
N
N − t+ 2H(δ)N + δnN ,
we conclude that the bound (13) is tighter than the bound Eq. (12).
2. For δ ≈ 0 and ǫ = a|M| however, (11) could give a higher value. For example, consider
|M| = 2N , ǫ = 1|M| , and n = O(N). The bound (13) is,
TR ≥
N · (− log( 1|M| + 2|M|))
(N − t) log |M| =
N
N − t (1 −
log 3
N
),
and the bound (11) is,
TR ≥ N
N − t+ ǫ′ ≥
N
N − t+ 2 N2N (1 +N) +O(N
2
2N )
=
N
N − t+O(N22N )
.
Hence the bound (11) is tighter than (13) for large N approaching infinity.
In [16], it was shown that the minimum round complexity of an SMT-PD protocol is
three, and PD must be invoked in at least two rounds. Since an (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD
is an SMT-PD with extra restrictions, the same bounds also hold for them. The rate-
optimal (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD protocol in Section 5.3 has three message rounds, two of
which use PD , and so achieves the lower bound on the number of rounds of (ǫ, δ)-
SMT[ow−s]-PD protocols.
Table 1. Comparison with SMT-PD protocols
SMT-PD
Num of Message
Rnds
Read and
Write
Sets
Communication
over PD
Info.
Rate
Trans. Rate
Shi et al. [16] 1 SMT 2 PD Sr = Sw ρ ≤ 1 log |M| 1−
t
N
− ξ O( N
N−t
)
Garay et al. Prot. I [9] 1 SMT 2 PD Sr = Sw ρ ≤ 1 log |M| 1−
t
N
− ξ O( N
N−t
)
Garay et al. Prot. II [9] 2 SMT 2 PD Sr = Sw ρ ≤ 1 log log |M| c(1−
t
N
) O( N
N−t
)
This Work 1 SMT 2 PD ρ ≤ 1 log |M| 1− t
N
− ξ O( N
N−t
)
c is a constant which is no more than 13 . The information rate of Protocols I and II are
derived in Appendix C.2.
7 Conclusion
Wemotivated and introducedAWTPPD, where Alice and Bob, in addition to the AWTP channel,
have access to a public discussion channel and showed that with this new resource, se-
cure communication is possible even when ρr + ρw ≥ 1 as long as ρ < 1. We derived
an upper bound on the information rate, and a lower bound on the number of message
rounds of protocols that provide ǫ-secrecy and δ-reliability, and constructed an optimal
protocol family that achieve both these bounds. We showed the relationship between
AWTPPD and (ǫ, δ)-SMT
[ow−s]-PD protocols in which wires are used by Alice only, and
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gave the construction of an optimal (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD protocol with minimum num-
ber of message rounds. A three-round protocol SMT-PD (two-way wires) with the same
rate had been constructed in [16]. Our construction shows that assuming one-way com-
munication over wires does not affect the number of message rounds of the optimal
protocols.
(ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD protocols remove the restriction of ρr + ρw ≤ 1 and allow secure
communication when ρr + ρw ≥ 1 as long as |Sr ∪ Sw| < N . In our model although we
allow interaction, but the AWTP channel is one-way. An interesting open question is to
obtain rate and RCm lower bounds for the case that interaction over the AWTP channel
is possible.
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A Proof of Section 4
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The proof is similar to Theorem 4.9 [3] and uses Pinsker’s Lemma:
Lemma 8. Let P , Q be probability distributions. Let SD(P,Q) ≤ ǫ. Then
H(P )− H(Q) ≤ 2ǫ · log( |P ∪Q|
ǫ
)
Let the random variable of the adversarial view, VE , be over the set VE . According to the
definition of ǫ-secrecy (Definition 5), for any pair of messagem1,m2 ∈ M, the statistical
distance between the distribution of VE when Alice sends m1, and the distribution of
VE when Alice sends m2, is no more than ǫ. That is
ǫ ≥ max
m1,m2
SD(VE |M = m1, VE |M = m2)
≥ max
m1,m2
∑
v∈VE
|Pr(v|m1)− Pr(v|m2)|
Assuming distribution Pr(m) onM, this implies,
SD(VE , VE |M = m)
=
1
2
∑
v∈VE
|Pr(v|m) − Pr(v)|
=
1
2
∑
v∈VE
|Pr(v|m) −
∑
m′
Pr(v|m′)Pr(m′)|
=
1
2
∑
v∈VE
|
∑
m′
Pr(m′)(Pr(v|m)− Pr(v|m′))|
≤ 1
2
∑
v∈VE
∑
m′
Pr(m′)|Pr(v|m) − Pr(v|m′)|
=
∑
m′
Pr(m′)
1
2
∑
v∈VE
|Pr(v|m) − Pr(v|m′)|
≤
∑
m′
Pr(m′) max
m1,m2
SD(VE |M = m1, VE |M = m2)
≤ ǫ
(15)
From Pinsker Lemma and Eq. (15), we have,
H(VE)− H(VE |M = m) ≤ 2ǫ · log( |VE |
ǫ
)
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From |VE | ≤ 2n × |Σ|N , it implies,
H(VE)− H(VE |M = m) ≤ 2ǫ · log( |Σ|
N
ǫ
) + 2ǫn
So the difference between H(M) and H(M |VE) is
H(M)− H(M |VE) = H(VE)− H(VE |M)
= H(VE)−
∑
m∈M
Pr(m)H(VE |m)
=
∑
m∈M
Pr(m)(H(VE)− H(VE |m))
≤ 2ǫN · log( |Σ|
ǫ
) + 2ǫn
(16)
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Let δ′ = H(δ) + δ log |M|. The proof has two steps.
1. We show that H(M |Cℓc,aY ℓc,wCℓc,dDℓd) ≤ δ′.
Let δ = Pr(MR 6= MS). From Fano’s inequality,
H(δ) + δ log |M| ≥ H(MS |MR) ≥ H(MS |Y ℓcDℓd)
Here {yℓc , dℓd}, is the received vectors of Bob. Since yℓc = {cℓc,a, yℓc,w, cℓc,d}, we have,
H(MS |Cℓc,aY ℓc,wCℓc,dDℓd) ≤ H(MS |MR) ≤ δ′ (17)
2. We show that
H(MS |Cℓc,aCℓc,dDℓd) ≤ δ′ + I(Y ℓc,w;Cℓc,w|Cℓc,aCℓc,dDℓd)
Writing the conditional entropy in two ways, we have,
H(MSY
ℓc,w|Cℓc,aCℓc,dDℓd)
= H(MS |Cℓc,aY ℓc,wCℓc,dDℓd) + H(Y ℓc,w|Cℓc,aCℓc,dDℓd)
= H(MS |Cℓc,aCℓc,dDℓd) + H(Y ℓc,w|Cℓc,aCℓc,dDℓdMS)
and so,
H(MS |Cℓc,aCℓc,dDℓd)
= H(MS |Cℓc,aY ℓc,wCℓc,dDℓd) + H(Y ℓc,w|Cℓc,aCℓc,dDℓd)− H(Y ℓc,w|Cℓc,aCℓc,dDℓdMS)
(18)
Because of the Markov chainMS → CℓcDℓd(= Cℓc,aCℓc,wCℓc,dDℓd)→ Cℓc,w, we have
H(Y ℓc,w|Cℓc,aCℓc,dDℓdMS) ≥ H(Y ℓc,w|Cℓc,aCℓc,wCℓc,dDℓd) (19)
From (17) (18) and (19), we have,
H(MS |Cℓc,aCℓc,dDℓd)
= H(MS |Cℓc,aY ℓc,wCℓc,dDℓd) + H(Y ℓc,w|Cℓc,aCℓc,dDℓd)− H(Y ℓc,w|Cℓc,aCℓc,dDℓdMS)
≤ δ′ + H(Y ℓc,w|Cℓc,aCℓc,dDℓd)− H(Y ℓc,w|Cℓc,aCℓc,wCℓ,dDℓd)
≤ δ′ + I(Y ℓc,w;Cℓc,w|Cℓc,aCℓc,dDℓd)
(20)
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Note that Y ℓc,w = Cℓc,w+Eℓc,w where Eℓc,w is a uniformly distributed variable, and
so
I(Y ℓc,w;Cℓc,w|Cℓc,aCℓc,dDℓd) = 0 (21)
This means that,
H(MS |Cℓc,aCℓc,dDℓd) ≤ δ′
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. We only show that it is impossible to have a twomessage round (0, δ)-AWTPPD protocol
of form with rate higher than 1− ρr − ρw:
1. Rnd 1: Alice
AWTP−→ Bob
2. Rnd 2: Alice
PD−→ Bob
The impossible result to have a two message round (0, δ)-AWTPPD protocol of form: Rnd
1, Alice
AWTP−→ Bob; Rnd 2, Alice AWTP−→ Bob, with rate higher than 1 − ρr − ρw, can be
proved similarly.
We only consider the case that ρr = 1 − ρw. The case that ρr > 1 − ρw can be proved
similarly.
We consider a pair of adversaries, {Adv2, ˆAdv2}, both with the following properties:
1. Adversary selects the reading and writing sets before the start of the AWTPPD protocol.
2. Adversary also chooses the error ew randomly and uniformly from ΣρwN . That is
Pr(ew) = 1|ΣρwN | .
Adversary Adv2 uses the read and write sets, S
r = {Sa, Sb} and Sw = {Sb, Sc}.
Because of ρr = 1− ρw, we have [N ] = SaSbScSd and |Sb| = |Sd|
Adversary ˆAdv2 uses the read and write sets, Sˆ
r = {Sa, Sd}, and Sˆw = {Sc, Sd}.
We have the following:
– Since the reading and writing capabilities of adversary Adv2 is same as the adver-
sary Adv1 in Section 4, using Lemma 2 we have,
H(M |CaCdD) ≤ H(δ) + δ(H(M)− 1) (22)
– Since the reading capability of ˆAdv2 is the same as Adv1 in Section 4, from Lemma
1, we have,
I(M ;CaCdD) = 0 (23)
– From (22) (23), we obtain,
H(δ) + δH(M) ≥ H(M |Cℓ,aCℓ,dDℓ) ≥ H(M)
and so,
H(δ)
1− δ ≥ H(M)
Since 0 ≤ δ < 12 and the message is uniformly distributed, we have,
1− 2H(δ) ≤ 2−2H(δ) ≤ 2−H(M) = 1|M|
and, 2H(δ) ≥ 1− 1|M| .
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B Proof of Section 5
B.1 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. First, assume the adversary reads the last ρrN components of c, and the first
(1−ρ)N components is the set of components that is neither read, nor written to, by the
adversary. Let v′E = {r(1−ρr)N+1 · · · rN , β(1−ρr)N+1 · · ·βN , α1 · · ·αN , t1 · · · tN , v0 · · · vN} de-
note the view of the adversary, except for c.
If ℓ ≤ (u − 1)(1 − ρ)N , the vector of random variables, (ri1 || · · · ||ris), corresponds to
a symbol-fixing source. The components that the adversary do not read are uniformly
distributed and are independent from the adversary’s view v′E , and the components that
the adversary reads are determined and fixed. So the randomness k that is generated
from the extractor, is uniformly distributed and is independent of the adversarial view.
That is,
Pr(k|v′E) = Pr(k) (24)
Second, since Alice selects the message m ∈ M independent from k and v′E , we have
Pr(m|k, v′E) = Pr(m). For any messagem ∈M, we have,
Pr(m) ≤ Pr(m|v′E) ≤ Pr(m|k, v′E) = Pr(m)
This implies,
Pr(m) = Pr(m|v′E) = Pr(m|k, v′E) (25)
and so we have,
Pr(k|m, v′E) =
Pr(k,m, v′E)
Pr(m, v′E)
=
Pr(m|k, v′E)Pr(k, v′E)
Pr(m|v′E)Pr(v3E′)
= Pr(k|v′E)
(26)
Third, the adversarial view for anym ∈M is vE = {c, v′E}, and so,
Pr(vE |m) = Pr(c, v′E |m)
= Pr(c|m, v′E)Pr(v′E |m)
(1)
= Pr(k|m, v′E)Pr(v′E)
(2)
= Pr(k)Pr(v′E)
where, (1) is from ci = ki +mi mod q for i = 1 · · · ℓ, and (2) is from (24) and (26).
This means the statistical distance between adversarial views of any two messages
m1,m2 ∈M, is zero and the AWTPPD protocol is perfectly secure. That is,
SD(ViewE |m1,ViewE |m2) =
∑
vE∈ViewE
|Pr(vE |m1)− Pr(vE |m2)| = 0
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B.2 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. First, we show the probability that vector (ri1 , · · · , ris) 6= (r′i1 , · · · , r′is) is no more
than uN
q
. This is from,
Pr((ri1 , · · · , ris) 6= (r′i1 , · · · , r′is))
≤
N∑
i=1
Pr(ri 6= r′i)
=
N∑
i=1
Pr(ri 6= r′i, vi = 1)
≤
N∑
i=1
Pr(ri 6= r′i, [hashαi(ri)− hashαi(r′i)] = [β′i − βi])
≤ uN
q
(27)
Second, for the two random vectors k = Ext(ri1 , · · · , ris) and k′ = Ext(r′i1 , · · · , r′is), we
have,
Pr(k 6= k′) ≤ Pr((ri1 , · · · , ris) 6= (r′i1 , · · · , r′is)) (28)
Third, Bob correctly receives d2 = {c,v} sent by Alice and so, mi + ki = m′i + k′i mod q
for i = 1 · · · ℓ. That is, the probability that the message m 6= m′, is the same as the
probability k 6= k′. That is,
Pr(m 6=m′) = Pr(k 6= k′) (29)
From (27) (28) (29), there is Pr(m 6=m′) = Pr(k 6= k′) ≤ uN
q
.
C Proof of Section 6
C.1 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. First, we show that there is a one-to-one correspondence between (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-
PD protocols and restricted (ǫ, δ)-AWTPPD protocols, in the sense that given one of the
former, a corresponding one in the latter can be constructed, and vice versa, and (ii)
given one of the that the security and reliability parameters of the two protocols are
the same.
1. Consider a (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD protocol, with a fixed public numbering of wires.
Recall that the in each message round of the (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD protocol, both the
wires and the PD can be invoked by Alice, while in our AWTPPD model, only one type
channel is invoked by Alice in each message round. In both models Bob can invoke
the PD in each message round. We can convert the protocol messages in message
round i of a (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD protocol to the protocol messages of message round
j and j + 1, of a AWTPPD protocol. In message round i, transmissions over wire 1
to N , defines a codeword of length N in the ith message round j of the AWTP . The
transmission over the PD directly defines the transmission over the PD in AWTPPD ,
in the j+1message round. Each message round of the transmission over PD , when
invoked by Bob in the (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD , defines a transmission over the PD for
the a(ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD protocol. The above transformation gives a AWTPPD from
a (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD . Similarly, a AWTPPD protocol defines an (ǫ, δ)-SMT
[ow−s]-PD
protocol.
So a restricted (ǫ, δ)-AWTPPD protocol can be constructed from (ǫ, δ)-SMT
[ow−s]-PD
protocol. Similarly, a (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD protocol can also be constructed from re-
stricted (ǫ, δ)-AWTPPD protocol.
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2. AWTPPD and (ǫ, δ)-SMT
[ow−s]-PD definitions of secrecy and reliability are the same.
Definition of ǫ-secrecy in both primitives requires statistical distance of the adver-
sary’s view for two messages chosen by the adversary (Compare definition 10 and
definition 5), to be bounded by ǫ. For δ-reliability, both primitives require the prob-
ability of outputting the correct message to be at least 1 − δ, and the probability of
outputting the wrong message to be at most δ.
Next, we show the lower bound of transmission rate for Using Theorem 4, for a (ǫ, δ)-
SMT[ow−s]-PD over N wires and t = ρN , there is a corresponding restricted (ǫ, δ)-
AWTPPD protocol whose rate is upper bounded by,
R ≤ 1− ρ+ 2ǫ(1 + log|Σ|
1
ǫ
) + 2ǫn
Since the transmission rate of a 1-(ǫ, δ)-SMT protocol is the inverse of the rate of the
corresponding restricted (ǫ, δ)-AWTPPD protocol, we have
TR =
1
R
≥ 1
1− 2ρ+ 2ǫ(1 + log|W| 1ǫ ) + 2ǫn
=
N
N − 2t+ 2Nǫ(1 + log|W| 1ǫ ) + 2ǫnN
Last, we show the lower bound on the message round of the (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD proto-
col. Since (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD protocol is a special case of (ǫ, δ)-SMT-PD protocol, and
it was shown that the lower bound on message round complexity for (ǫ, δ)-SMT-PD
protocol is at least three, the lower bound of (ǫ, δ)-SMT[ow−s]-PD protocol is also three.
C.2 Detail of bounding c1 and c2
Proof. We use the notations in [9].
From [9], we have log |Wi| ≥ N , N = K1−D , K = kminn−t + λ, kmin = m, and log |M| = m.
This gives the information rate,
log |M|∑n
i=1 log |Wi|
=
m
nN
=
m
n 11−D (
m
n−t + λ)
.
Let ξ > 0 be a small constant. Choose λ = n
2
ξ
, D = ξ, and m = n
2
ξ2
(n− t).
So the information rate is,
log |M|∑n
i=1 log |Wi|
=
m
n
1−ξ
m
n−t (1 + ξ)
≥ 1− t
n
− 2ξ
Let n0 be an integer that satisfies n0 ≥ 1ξ and 1e ≤ n
2
0
√
1
n2
0
. The decoding error is for
n ≥ n0 is,
δ = t(1 −D)λ ≤ n(1− ξ)n
2
ξ
(1)
= n(
1
e
)n
2
=
n
n2
≤ ξ,
where (1) is from (1− ξ) 1ξ → 1
e
as ξ → 0.
That is the information rate of protocol I [9] approaches 1 − t
n
− ξ as the number of
wires n approaches infinity.
Secondly, we show the bound of c.
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From [9], we have log |Wi| ≥ N +K, N = 2K, K ≥ rn−t , and log |M| = r. This implies,
log |M|∑n
i=1 log |Wi|
=
r
nN
≤ r
3n r
n−t
=
1
3
(1− t
n
)
So there is c ≤ 13 .
It implies the information rate of protocol II [9] is approximate to c(1− t
n
) as the number
of wires n is approximate to infinity, with c ≤ 13 .
